John Mackie's seminal 1977 work is essential reading for any student of ethics. In this work, Mackie explicates an argument from queerness against the existence of objective moral facts. Mackie also examines the effects of this revelation on the status of some established moral systems and makes recommendations for proceeding with moral investigation.
Mackie opens the book bluntly with the statement “There are no objective values.” This first sentence is indicative of Mackie's style throughout the book. He is direct, but nuanced and precise with his terminology and language. He continues the first section by explaining exactly what he intends to argue and why he considers this important. Mackie makes two clarifications about his method. He says:
First, what I have called moral scepticism is a negative doctrine, not a positive one: it says what there isn't, not what there is.
Secondly, what I have called moral scepticism is an ontological thesis, not a linguistic or conceptual one.
But why does arguing against objective values matter at all? Mackie says “The denial of objective values can carry with it an extreme emotional reaction, a feeling that nothing matters at all, that life has lost its purpose.” Having had this experience myself, I can attest to its disquieting effect. My revelation of atheism was far less profound than my realization that moral values were also fictitious. It seems like a generally good idea (with the reduction of angst as my objective) to disseminate the good news that moral facts aren't real. That way, hopefully in the future no one will need to come to this rather unpleasant realization. I was speaking to Sheena today and was surprised to learn that she's always had that view. Perhaps it's something about being raised generally atheist? Does being atheist natively give one the general impression that all moralizing is simply opinionated grunting? I guess that seems to be a possibility.
Mackie takes care to explain exactly what he's attacking. One could argue against Mackie's claims by saying “Well, when we moralize, we're actually making some kind of promise.” Mackie sees this potential objection, the appeal to some kind of institution, and clarifies that he has no real problem with this. A statement like “It's wrong to move a knight straight forward 3 spaces in chess” is fine. We're appealing to the rules of the game of chess when we say this. Mackie claims that, if we have some kind of rule in mind when we say “It's wrong to do X” then we've done nothing wrong. Where we err is in saying “It is wrong to do X” without an appeal to some rule.
Mackie then has to show that people do indeed appeal to an objective morality when they make moral judgments. He does this by examining what people could be referring to when they make moral judgments. The other things that they could be referring to, for example, their own opinion of the matter, don't seem to carry the same weight that an objective measure does. Mackie says this:
Someone in a state of moral perplexity, wondering whether it would be wrong for him to engage, say, in research related to bacteriological warfare, wants to arrive at some judgment about this concrete case, his doing this work at this time in these actual circumstances; his relevant characteristics will be part of the subject of the judgment, but no relation between him and the proposed action will be part of the predicate. The question is not, for example, whether he really wants to do this work, whether it will satisfy or dissatisfy him, whether he will in the long run have a pro-attitude towards it, or even whether this is an action of a sort that he can happily and sincerely recommend in all relevantly similar cases. Nor is he even wondering just whether to recommend such action in all relevantly similar cases. He wants to know whether this course of action would be wrong in itself. Something like this is the everyday objectivist concept of which talk about non-natural qualities is a philosopher's reconstruction.
That's a pretty persuasive argument that when we make moral judgments, we're appealing to some sort of objective quality. If that's the case, as it seems to be, then Mackie's determination of whether moral facts exist or not will likely impact us.
Once Mackie has clarified exactly what he's attacking and that it matters, he proceeds to give two arguments against objective moral values. The first is the argument from relativity, which he doesn't spend much time at all on. This section constitutes about 2 pages in his book. Once he's dispensed with it, he moves on to his argument from queerness.
Mackie's argument from queerness is quite persuasive. The gist is that Mackie says that normal facts such as “It is Wednesday” simply tell us facts about the world. They're informative only. Whereas, if moral facts exist, they have to be not only informative but also normative. A moral fact would have a “to be doneness” to it. Mackie argues that if moral facts do exist, how could this “to be doneness” operate? He puts it this way:
What is the connection between the natural fact that an action is a piece of deliberate cruelty - say, causing pain just for the fun - and the moral fact that it is wrong?
Ultimately, Mackie answers that there simply is no connection. The statement that “It is wrong to cause pain just for the fun” is simply an opinion. It carries to factive weight. That's pretty distressing for anyone who appeals to objective moral values.
In part two of the book, Mackie examines several popular moral systems in light of this revelation. He ultimately has little good to say about Utilitarianism and uses Smart's pleasure machine argument as an example of how positing pleasure as the ultimate goal of a moral system can be a failing. I had trouble finding a good source of Smart's pleasure machine argument, but it appears to be the same thing as Nozick's experience machine argument, just earlier.
After making his cases against several popular moral systems, Mackie describes what he thinks a moral system should provide. Most of his recommendations follow already popular thinking. A good moral system should probably respect property rights, allow people maximal liberty without disturbing others, etc. He ultimately says that his system could be described as a complicated rule utilitarianism or maybe rule egoism, which seems not far from my own views.
In the final portion of the book, Mackie examines what he calls the frontiers of ethics, which involves two chapters, the first on determinism and the other on religion, law, and politics. Mackie doesn't have a great deal of interesting stuff to say about these, although it is helpful reading to get acquainted with those issues and perhaps to pursue more reading in the future.
Ultimately, the biggest take away from the book is indeed the centerpiece, Mackie's argument from queerness. It's a classic argument against the existence of objective moral values, one that is still cited to this day and which doesn't seem to be going anywhere. I know that Christine Korsgaard cites (and disagrees!) with it in her book The Sources of Normativity which I hope to read soon. It's also the foundation for Richard Joyce's The Myth of Morality, which I also hope to read soon. I'm glad to have read Mackie for two reasons. First and foremost, I think I have solid evidence for my disbelief in objective moral facts. And secondly, I feel prepared to read other works that reference the argument from queerness. All around, a very valuable and worthwhile book. Also, Mackie has a few other books that sound very interesting. The two that caught my eye were The Miracle of Theism and The Cement of the Universe.